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Potential for Army Integration 
of Autonomous Systems by 
Warfighting Function
Maj. Thomas Ryan, U.S. Army 
Vikram Mittal, PhD
Strategists analyze military history to understand the evolution of war. However, they often turn to science fiction to predict the future of war. Star 
Wars: Episode 1–The Phantom Menace captures a standard 
vision of the future of ground combat—autonomous ro-
bots marching into war with the guidance of their human 
overlords. This view follows fairly simple logic: Combat is 
dangerous, so why not use technology to reduce the risk 
to humans? Meanwhile, other movies are equally adept 
at capturing the opposing view of the use of autonomous 
systems in combat. Take The Matrix and Terminator mov-
ies as examples. These movies preach a cautionary tale 
that autonomous systems can create an unparalleled ca-
pacity to destroy an adversary; however, left unchecked, 
the overuse of autonomy can destroy humanity.
These beliefs are captured in the Army’s official 
stance toward the use of autonomous systems, which 
clarifies that autonomous systems are intended to 
support the warfighter, not replace them.1 As such, 
the vision of dropping a large number of robotic 
combatants onto a battlefield, as seen in the Star Wars 
movies, is science fiction. However, the use of auton-
omous systems moving soldiers into combat is readily 
becoming science reality.
It is widely known that the Army has steadily been 
investing in the development of autonomous systems. 
As shown conceptually in figure 1 (on page 124), 
which plots the combat power of the Army against 
the total end strength, the use of autonomous systems 
provides a strategic advantage. Autonomous systems 
provide a combat multiplication factor that allows the 
Army to increase its combat power while potentially 
reducing troop numbers. Currently, the investments 
in autonomy are limited by financial constraints as 
well as the state of technology. Though these limited 
investments still result in a significant increase in the 
combat multiplication factor, these increases are small 
compared to what is possible if autonomous systems 
are integrated to their maximum capacity.
Marines with 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment test new equipment 
such as the unmanned Multi-Utility Tactical Transport (MUTT) vehi-
cle 8 July 2016 in a simulated combat environment at Marine Corps 
Base at Camp Pendleton, California. The MUTT is designed as a force 
multiplier to enhance expeditionary power, enabling marines to cover 
larger areas and providing superior firepower with the smallest tactical 
footprint possible. (Photo by Lance Cpl. Julien Rodarte, U.S. Marines)
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This article sets out to explain the maximum extent 
that the Army can integrate autonomous systems into its 
operations given the inherent limitations of the technol-
ogy. These limitations determine the appropriateness of 
using autonomous systems to perform each of the broad 
range of Army tasks that are captured through the warf-
ighter functions. While certain tasks will remain human 
driven, other tasks can be fully automated, although most 
tasks will fall somewhere between. In turn, this analysis 
provides insights and guidance into the resource allocation 
and implementation of autonomous systems.
Warfighting Functions
To remain competitive in a multi-domain operational 
environment, the question is not “should we” but “where 
do we” become more autonomous? The Army is made up 
of over a million different soldiers comprising over 450 
different military occupational specialties, ranging from 
infantrymen to plumbers to veterinarians. Some of these 
jobs could greatly benefit from the addition of autonomy 
while others would not. The broad range of tasks asso-
ciated with these different duty positions are typically 
captured in the six warfighting functions.
A warfighting function is a group of tasks and 
systems (people, organizations, information, and pro-
cesses) united by a common purpose that command-
ers use to accomplish missions.2 The six warfighting 
functions of the U.S. Army are
•  mission command: the integration of the other five 
warfighting functions to enable a commander to bal-
ance the art of command and the science of control;
•  movement and maneuver: the achieving of a 
position of relative advantage over the enemy and 
other threats to the employment of force;
•  intelligence: the gathering and processing of infor-
mation to develop an understanding of the enemy, 
terrain, and civil considerations;
•  fires: the use of Army indirect fires, air and mis-
sile defense, and joint fires through the targeting 
process;
•  sustainment: the providing of support and services to 
ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, 
and prolong endurance; and
•  protection: the preserving of the force so that a 
commander may apply maximum combat power 
to accomplish a mission.3
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Each warfighting function is 
comprised of several top-level 
subfunctions. For example, the 
sustainment warfighting func-
tion includes providing logistics, 
personnel, and health-service 
support. In turn, each of these 
top-level subfunctions include 
several lower-level subfunctions. 
Providing logistics support, for 
example, comprises providing 
maintenance, transportation, 
supply, field services, operational 
contract, distribution, and gener-
al engineer support.
Altogether, 205 different 
lower-level subfunctions con-
stitute the full scope of Army 
missions.4 These lower-level 
functions are fairly specific and 
provide enough granularity for 
analysis of the appropriateness 
of autonomy for that function. 
For example, little autonomy 
can be applied toward providing religious support. 
However, a high level of autonomy can be applied to-
ward employing communications security. The results 
are then aggregated up for each top-level subfunction 
and warfighting function.
Rules for Autonomy
A review of different federal policies and strategies 
provided a set of rules related to the implementation of 
autonomous systems in ground combat. The appropriate-
ness of applying autonomy to each lower-level subfunction 
is subject to the following six rules:
1. Autonomous systems should be used over hu-
mans in potentially dangerous situations, subject 
to the other rules.
2. Autonomous systems will be preferred over 
humans for computationally intensive tasks, thus 
allowing an overall reduction in the likelihood 
of human mental errors. Similarly, autonomous 
systems should be used for severely mundane tasks 
that require mental endurance.
3. Military command positions, whether they be 
American, allied, or adversary, will remain human.
4. Humans will be preferred over autonomous sys-
tems for certain tasks that require a human-to-hu-
man connection, such as key leader engagements 
and chaplain support.
5. The usage of autonomous systems cannot result in a 
decrease in the Army’s ability to perform its missions.
6. Human judgment, or “human-in-the-loop,” will be re-
quired for any activities that involve killing a human.
The United States has already laid the groundwork 
for the sixth rule with Department of Defense Directive 
3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, which limits 
the development of autonomous weapons that do not 
include humans in the kill chain.5 On a global level, 
similar initiatives are underway, since autonomous 
killing systems would set off a technical arms race where 
countries would rapidly develop more advanced artificial 
intelligence with faster kill chains.6
Levels of Autonomy
While autonomous systems are often envisioned as 
Terminator-style robots, in reality, autonomous sys-
tems can range from automated payroll software to 






















































Figure 1. Trade-Off between the Overall Combat 
Power and Troop End Strength at Varying Levels of 
Integration of Autonomous Systems
(Figure by authors)
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With a broad range of levels of 
autonomy, it is useful to catego-
rize autonomy into fixed ranges. 
The table displays four different 
levels of autonomy that will be 
used for this analysis.
A value of 0 indicates that 
no automation is currently 
being used; an example of an 
autonomy level of 0 would be 
driving a traditional car. A value 
of 1 indicates that a human 
uses an automated system to 
increase their ability to com-
plete the task, such as a cruise 
control system in the car. A 
value of 2 indicates that the human 
and automated system are work-
ing together to complete the task, 
though the human is primarily pro-
viding the system with inputs, such 
as a “self-driving” car with a backup 
human or remote operator. A value 
of 3 indicates that the human is tak-
en out of the loop, and the system is 
performing the task on its own, such 
as a fully autonomous car that can 
navigate itself through traffic from 
one waypoint to another.
Each lower-level subfunction 
of the warfighting function was 
analyzed to determine the maximum 
level of autonomy subject to the rules 
identified in the previous section.
Intelligence Warfighting Function
The intelligence warfighting function is the most 
pervasive and encompassing task in the military 
because its results drive all operations.7 As shown in 
figure 2, the intelligence warfighting function is made 
up of four subfunctions with the potential to use a 
significant amount of autonomy.
Currently, autonomous systems are supporting 
human analysts in virtually all of the subfunctions, 
since they allow the analysts to more readily collect and 
process data. Unmanned aerial vehicles have been used 
for intelligence gathering for decades. Additionally, 
autonomous software codes are used for cyberspace 
monitoring to gather intelligence. There are also 
systems under development, such as the U.S. Special 
Operations Command’s hyper-enabled operator, that 
will use a higher level of autonomy to automate the full 
intelligence process from collection to analysis.
The use of autonomous systems for these warfight-
ing functions are driven by rules 1 and 2. Intelligence 
gathering is a dangerous activity, often requiring hu-
mans to travel behind enemy lines to collect data about 
the enemy and terrain. Much of this data can be col-
lected by autonomous systems as they have the capacity 
to collect and process a large amount of raw data.
1–2
•     Intelligence support to ground operations















•     Support to situational understanding
•     Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Figure 2. Autonomy Levels for the Intelligence 
Warfighting Function 
(Figure by authors; subfunctions in blue italics indicate areas currently using autonomy)
Table. Different Levels of Autonomy
(Table by authors)
Autonomy Level Description
0 No autonomy, humans only
1 Automated system aids humans
2 Human manages automated system
3 Automated system only
Despite these benefits, certain subfunctions are lim-
ited in the amount of possible autonomy. Intelligence 
support to ground operations will still require a hu-
man-in-the-loop to understand the human dimension 
associated with ground operations. Additionally, target-
ing requires a human-in-the-loop to allow for human 
judgment in the data analysis. However, intelligence 
support to situational understanding, and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance can both achieve a 
fairly high degree of autonomy.
Movement and Maneuver 
Warfighting Function
The movement and maneuver warfighting function 
encompasses those functions involved in moving and 
employing direct force against enemy forces.8 The sub-
tasks include maneuver operations, tactical movements, 
direct fires, occupying areas, performing reconnais-
sance, and other related tasks. Figure 3 (on page 127) 
displays the possible levels of autonomy for the move-
ment and maneuver warfighting function.
Currently, there is a large push to integrate auton-
omy into this warfighting function, especially for the 
tactical movement and reconnaissance subfunctions. 
For example, the Squad Multipurpose Equipment 
Transport is a robotic vehicle that follows a dismount-
ed squad, enhancing their movement by carrying 
much of their equipment. Another important effort 
is the Future Vertical Lift Aircraft, which will include 
autonomous flight capabilities, allowing units not to 
be constrained to the human-limits of flight crews.9 
Several other programs, such as the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency’s Squad X Experimentation 
Program, are looking at further enhancing the use of 
autonomous systems, especially for reconnaissance.
Several projects also involve integrating autono-
my into tactical maneuver and direct fire operations. 
A QinetiQ Talon 5 robot moves a drone 7 May 2019 during a Raven’s 
Challenge exercise at Winter Park, Colorado. Raven’s Challenge is an 
annual event that provides interoperability training in a realistic, do-
mestic, tactical environment to explosive ordnance disposal person-
nel and public safety bomb squads of both military and government 
agencies. (Photo by Sgt. Zakia Gray, U.S. Army) 
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However, these projects are fairly constrained, such 
as the Advanced Targeting and Lethality Automated 
System Program, which is simply a remote-operated 
gun on a mobile platform that provides additional 
standoff from a target; however, it still requires a 
designated operator.
The level of autonomy is set for 
the movement and maneuver warf-
ighting function based on rule 6, and a 
high level of autonomy is possible for 
two of the subfunctions—performing 
reconnaissance and employing obscu-
rants—because they do not require 
the use of lethal force. A lower level 
of autonomy can be integrated into 
three of the other subfunctions—tac-
tical troop movements, occupying an 
area, and countermobility operations. 
These subfunctions can involve the 
use of force, so human involvement 
is required though it can be primarily 
oversight. The other four subfunc-
tions—mobility operations, tactical 
maneuver, direct fires, and force 
projection—involve the direct use of 
force, as such, autonomy can be used 
in only a very limited capacity.
The integration of autonomous 
systems is fairly limited by the re-
quirement of having a human in the 
kill chain. As such, autonomous systems are 
more useful for defensive operations than 
offensive operations. Offensive operations 
involve closing in on and killing the enemy, 
which inherently requires a human in the 
loop. However, security and defensive oper-
ations tend to involve deterring the enemy, 
which can be done without lethal force, hence 
allowing autonomy.
Fires Warfighting Function
Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1-03, 
The Army Universal Task List, gives the four 
top-level subfunctions for the fires warfighting 
functions: integrate fires, provide fire support, 
integrate air-ground operations, and employ 
air and missile defense.10 Each subtask and the 
associated autonomy levels are displayed in figure 4.
The current usage of autonomy in the fires war-
fighting function is limited to detecting threats and 
supporting the computations required for provid-
ing direct fire support. However, humans are still 
required to aim and fire weapons. Most artillery 
1–2
•     Mobility operations
•     Tactical maneuver
•     Direct res
•     Force projection and deployment
•     Tactical troop movements
•     Occupation of an area
•     Countermobility operations
•     Reconnaissance















Figure 3. Autonomy Levels for the Movement 
and Maneuver Warfighting Function
(Figure by authors; subfunctions in blue italics indicate areas currently using autonomy)
1–2
•     Integration of les
•     Integration of air-ground operations














•     Fire support
Figure 4. Autonomy Levels for the Fires 
Warfighting Function
(Figure by authors; subfunctions in blue italics indicate areas currently using autonomy)
September-October 2019 MILITARY REVIEW128
systems, such as the M109 
Paladin, include comput-
er software to help auto-
mate the targeting process. 
Additionally, these systems 
are being upgraded with 
advanced automated technol-
ogy to allow for better threat 
detection, faster targeting, and 
automated aiming.
Similar to the movement 
and maneuver warfighting 
function, rule 6 sets which sub-
functions in the fires warfighting 
function can use autonomy. 
Fire support involves the direct 
employment of force against an 
enemy, so although autonomy 
can support the soldier, its usage 
is limited. The integration of 
fires and air-ground operations 
are both supporting subtasks. 
Therefore, a certain amount of 
autonomy is applicable, al-
though humans are still required 
for prioritization of fires. Air-
missile defense is a defensive 
operation and does not require 
killing humans. Additionally, it 
is a computationally intensive 
process that requires very fast action. As such, this sub-
function is ripe for the use of autonomous systems.
Protection Warfighting Function
The protection warfighting function is comprised 
of fifteen top-level subfunctions ranging from law-
and-order operations to explosive ordnance disposal 
to air-missile defense.11 These subfunctions are catego-
rized by their possible levels of autonomy in figure 5.
The protection warfighting function is primarily 
defensive in nature. As previously discussed, autonomy 
can be better applied to defensive operations rather than 
offensive. However, the use of autonomy for this warf-
ighting function is set by rule 4, since some of its func-
tions require substantial human-to-human interaction, 
including police operations, resettlement operations, 
and health protection. Other subfunctions still require 
some human-to-human interaction, such that a human 
must be kept in the loop. These subfunctions include 
personnel operations, safety, antiterrorism measures, 
1–2
•     Health service support
•     Personnel support


















•     Police operations
•     Resettlement operations
•     Force health protection
•     Personnel recovery
•     Safety techniques
•     Antiterrorism measures
•     Detention operations
•     Air and missile defense
•     Explosive ordnance disposal
•     Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations
•     Physical security
•     Operational area security
•     Operations security















Figure 5. Autonomy Levels for the Protection 
Warfighting Function
(Figure by authors; subfunctions in blue italics indicate areas currently using autonomy)
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and detention operations. However, the bulk of the tasks 
associated with the protection of warfighting functions 
can incorporate a large amount of autonomy.
Despite the high potential, the current usage of au-
tonomous systems in the protection warfighting function 
is somewhat limited. Air-missile defense systems use 
autonomous systems to track and destroy incoming fires. 
Additionally, explosive ordnance disposal personnel use 
remote-controlled autonomous systems such as TALON 
and PackBot robots to provide standoff from explosives.
The protection warfighting function has numerous 
opportunities for the use of advanced autonomy in 
future operations. These opportunities are for a number 
of reasons. First, protection is inherently responsive in 
nature, such that an action is performed following a 
specific input. These actions normally require a fast re-
sponse time, and autonomous systems have the potential 
to have faster response times than humans. 
Second, many of the tasks follow doctrinal 
steps, which require minimal human judg-
ment and are ripe for autonomy. Third, many 
of these tasks involve placing humans in 
compromising positions.
Take survivability operations for exam-
ple. The construction of a fortified battle po-
sition requires digging fighting positions and 
placing and filling Hesco baskets (used to 
construct large barriers). A remote-operated 
front loader, often used for commercial ap-
plications, would allow a soldier to perform 
these tasks from a protected location. With 
further integration efforts, one could imag-
ine drawing a battle position on a map, and a 
team of autonomous systems surveying the 
area, performing the threat assessment, de-
signing an optimal battle position, and con-
structing it prior to humans arriving on-site. 
Upon completion of the fortified position, 
autonomous systems could help detect and 
deter encroachment into the area.
Sustainment 
Warfighting Function
The sustainment warfighting function is 
broken down into three high-level tasks: logis-
tics, personnel, and health service support.12 
Figure 6 (on page 128) displays how much 
autonomy can be applied to each of these subfunctions.
Currently, autonomous systems are used sparingly for 
the sustainment warfighting function. Automating the 
tasks that fall under logistics would require significant up-
dates to the bulk of military vehicles and equipment. This 
process is expensive, resources are limited, and current 
sustainment capabilities are sufficient. However, with the 
increased threat of improvised explosive devices and the 
dangers associated with convoy operations, autonomous 
convoys, which leverage self-driving technology, would 
reduce troop numbers while also saving lives.
Similar to the protection warfighting function, 
rule 4 sets the limits on the maximum autonomy 
levels for each subfunction. Both health service 
support and personnel require a certain amount 
of human-to-human interaction; however, certain 
portions of these subfunctions can be automated. 
1–2
•     Operations process
•     Command post operations
•     Execution of command programs
•     Team development
•     Soldier-leader engagement
•     Public aair operations
•     Military deception
•     Information support operations
•     Civil aairs operations
•     Knowledge and information management
•     Control of tactical airspace
•     Integration of space operations
•     Cyberelectromagnetic activities
•     Network installation and maintenance















Figure 7. Autonomy Levels for the Mission 
Command Warfighting Function
(Figure by authors; subfunctions in blue italics indicate areas currently using autonomy)
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For example, financial management support, which 
falls under personnel support, can benefit from 
autonomous software that handle payroll. However, 
chaplain support, which also falls under personnel 
support, will still require a chaplain.
Logistics can achieve a significantly higher de-
gree of autonomy. Many of the tasks included under 
logistics support follow set procedures; for example, 
performing preventive maintenance checks and 
services on a vehicle requires going down a checklist 
and making sure that the vehicle functions properly. 
When processes follow very set procedures, they are 
ripe for autonomy.
Additionally, there are numerous strategic benefits 
from incorporating autonomy into the sustainment 
warfighting function. The displacement of humans by 
autonomous systems would expand operational reach. 
Enemies have traditionally targeted supply lines as easy 
targets, which then require additional security, drawing 
away soldiers from more critical missions. Autonomous 
systems would require less security and can assume 
more risk, allowing them to move faster and through 
areas that are not safe for humans.
Mission Command 
Warfighting Function
As the name implies, the mission command warf-
ighting function involves providing command guidance 
and leadership to integrate the other five warfighter 
functions to perform unified land operations. The 
mission command warfighting function can be broken 
down into fifteen subtasks, which are categorized by 
possible autonomy levels in figure 7 (on page 129).
Rules 3 and 4 set the maximum limits for the use 
of autonomy in this warfighting function. Leadership 
and command guidance must be provided by hu-
mans, so autonomy is limited for the operations 
process, command-post operations, and execution 
A marine with 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment looks down at an 
autonomous “dragon fire” system 13 July 2016 at Marine Corps Base 
Camp Pendleton, California. The system, meant to enhance observa-
tion of an enemy before marines engage them, was built by the Ma-
rine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. It is durable, invertible with front 
and rear cameras, and both day and night capable. (Photo by Lance 
Cpl. Julien Rodarte, U.S. Marines)
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of command programs. 
Additionally, human-to-hu-
man interactions are required 
for team development and 
soldier-leader engagements. 
A slightly higher degree of 
autonomy can be applied to 
tasks that are not directly tied 
to leadership positions. These 
tasks include public affair oper-
ations, military deception, in-
formation support operations, 
and civil affairs operations. 
However, the usage of auton-
omy will only play a support-
ing role due to the necessary 
human-to-human interactions 
associated with these tasks.
Several of the subfunctions 
are tied to the virtual domain, 
and the application of auto-
mation would greatly enhance 
these subfunctions. These in-
clude knowledge management, 
control of tactical airspace, 
integration of space operations, 
cyberelectromagnetic activities, and network and 
synchronizing information.
Due to the requirement of humans being in lead-
ership positions, little effort has been put into develop-
ing autonomous systems to support this warfighting 
function. However, there is a significant opportunity 
for certain subfunctions that are not related to being in 
leadership positions.
Current Resource Allocation 
toward Autonomy
Figure 8 plots the current resource allocation to-
ward autonomous systems against the overall poten-
tial for integration. The plot shows that a significant 
amount of resources are allocated for the intelligence, 
movement and maneuver, and fires warfighting 
functions. However, both the movement and maneu-
ver and the fires warfighting functions are limited 
into how much total autonomy can be applied to it. 
Meanwhile, much fewer resources have been allocat-
ed for the protection and sustainment warfighting 
functions, which have a significant potential for the 
overall integration of autonomous systems.
The current alignment of resources to potential for 
automation is not optimized. This is due to equipment 
and technology development for the movement and 
maneuver, fires, and intelligence warfighting functions 
receiving priority over the other three warfighting 
functions. For example, though the Army Equipment 
Modernization Strategy includes investments for all 
warfighting functions, priority is given to these three 
warfighting functions, with more risk being assumed 
for the other three warfighting functions. Likewise, 
most of the Army science and technology near-term, 
mid-term, and long-term investments are related to 
these warfighting functions.13
While the investments in the fires and movement 
and maneuver warfighting functions offer new ca-
pabilities to the soldier, a much larger benefit can be 
made from applying autonomy to the sustainment and 
protection warfighting functions. Since these warfight-
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Figure 8. Current Resource Allocation toward the 
Integration of Autonomous Systems Plotted against 
the Overall Potential for Integration
(Figure by authors)
integration of autonomous systems, the combat mul-
tiplication factor is higher. More simply stated, entire 
companies of protection and sustainment personnel 
can be replaced with autonomous systems supported 
by a few personnel for leadership and quality assurance. 
These new autonomous systems will potentially be 
faster, more efficient, and safer.
Note that though man-unmanned pairings and 
integrating robots into the squad is in the distant 
future, commercial technology is currently available to 
support the sustainment and protection warfighting 
function. Self-driving vehicles that can convoy, robotic 
maintenance systems, package delivery systems by 
drones, autonomous network monitoring, and GPS-
guided farm equipment are all technology that could 
have military applications.
Reduction in Numbers and Benefits
The integration of autonomy into the warfight-
ing functions creates opportunities for a reduction 
in troop count, assuming that the Army wishes to 
maintain a given level of combat power. Typically, an 
autonomy level of 1 will result in a new capability that 
will allow the Army to complete the task more expe-
diently. An autonomy level of 2 will not only result 
in a new capability but also the ability to reduce the 
number of soldiers. This reduction is typically at an in-
dividual level, such that individuals in a squad could be 
replaced with an autonomous system. Meanwhile, an 
autonomy level of 3 will result in replacing an entire 
unit with an autonomous system, only leaving a few 
humans for quality assurance.
The sustainment and protection warfighting 
functions both have a significant number of tasks that 
can be automated. Additionally, in the Global War 
on Terrorism, approximately 70 percent of deployed 
soldiers were tied to these two warfighting functions. 
As such, the application of autonomy toward these 
warfighting functions would allow for a significant 
reduction in boots on the ground.
The largest benefit of replacing humans with 
autonomous systems is safety. Using autonomous sys-
tems in dirty, dangerous, and dull situations reduces 
the risk to soldiers. However, there are substantial 
cost savings as well. For monetary reasons, the U.S. 
government has strived to reduce troop numbers in 
the past while maintaining the overall strength of the 
force. The most cost-effective, long-term method is 
through incorporating autonomous systems. Though 
these systems carry an initial high development cost, 
An autonomously activated device emits vapor to obscure the rear of 
a utility task vehicle 26 April 2019 during the Robotic Complex Breach 
Concept, a military event focused on autonomous technologies at Ya-
kima Training Center, Washington. (Photo by Lance Cpl. Nathaniel 
Hamilton, U.S. Marines)
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the reduction in troop numbers across the Army 
would offset these costs. Soldiers carry a large life 
cycle cost since they must be trained, paid, billeted, 
and equipped while they are in the service; addition-
ally, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs provides 
health care after they leave the military.
Alternatively, the Army may decide to keep its 
end state. In that case, the use of autonomous systems 
could afford a redistribution of personnel by military 
occupational specialty. The current heuristic is that 
for every individual combat soldier, there are ap-
proximately two to three support soldiers. Increased 
investment in autonomy for the sustainment warf-
ighting function has the ability to significantly reduce 
this ratio. With a constant end state, this could result 
in an increase in combat soldiers.
Conclusion
Some may perceive the future of autonomous 
systems in the Army as formations of armed robots 
marching into combat; however, this situation is 
unlikely due to the constraints placed on autono-
mous systems in combat. Moreover, it is shortsighted 
because it only addresses a small portion of the tasks 
that the Army is required to perform.
This study set out to determine what the max-
imum integration of autonomous systems into the 
Army would look like. In particular, it looked at each 
of the warfighting functions and supporting subfunc-
tions to determine the applicability of using auton-
omy to support that function. In some instances, an 
autonomous system could perform the function with 
little human oversight, while in other instances, only 
humans can perform the function.
The results found that while autonomy could 
benefit all the warfighting functions, the intelligence, 
protection, and sustainment warfighting functions 
could benefit the most. This finding does not align 
with the current Army investments into autono-
mous systems, which are more focused on the move-
ment and maneuver, intelligence, and fires warfight-
ing functions. Significant benefits can be realized 
through the application of autonomous systems to 
the protection and sustainment warfighting func-
tions, resulting in an increase in combat power while 
reducing troop numbers.   
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